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Indirect Initiative and Unpopular 
Referendum in Missouri 
Pippens v. Ashcroft, 606 S.W.3d 689 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020). 
Gunnar Johanson* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Most governments in the United States operate as a representative 
democracy through elected officials.  Over time, advocates have successfully 
reformed many of our institutions to give citizens themselves more power 
through direct democracy.  The direct election of United States Senators, the 
presidential primary, recall, the direct initiative, and popular referendum are 
all developments in the governments of the United States that place power 
directly in the hands of voters.  Direct initiatives and popular referendums, 
specifically, are lingering evidence of the Progressive Era of the 1900s.1  Like 
most reforms of that time, proponents of direct initiative and popular 
referendum believed it would aid in breaking up concentrated political power 
in corporations and their enablers in the state legislatures.2  Almost half the 
states instituted direct initiative and popular referendum before 1920.3 
Direct initiative and popular referendum generally describe tools of 
direct democracy that vary from state to state; there is no national initiative or 
referendum process.4  The direct initiative process enables citizens to propose 
a new or amended law, independently of the state legislature, often by popular 
 
* B.A., Political Science, University of Missouri–Columbia, 2016; J.D. 
Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2022; Associate Member, Missouri 
Law Review, 2020–2021; Associate Editor-in-Chief, Missouri Law Review, 2021–
2022. I would like to thank Professor Thomas Bennett, Jackson Gilkey, and Maddie 
McMillian for their guidance during the writing of this Note. 
1. UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM 
INSTITUTE, http://www.iandrinstitute.org/ [https://perma.cc/UH6A-SCM3]. 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Dennis Polhill, The Issue of a National Initiative Process, INITIATIVES V. 
OLIGARCHY, https://cusdi.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Polhill-The-Issue-of-a-
National-Initiative-Process.pdf [https://perma.cc/CL5L-HEMA] (this article can be 
accessed directly from the Citizens for United Stated Direct Initiatives (CUSDI) 
website under the provided pdf references). 
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vote in a statewide election.5  Popular referendum, by contrast, “allow[s] 
voters to approve or repeal an act of the legislature.”6  Initiatives can be 
statutory or constitutional.7  Direct initiative proponents frequently prefer 
constitutional amendments as most states do not allow the legislature to 
unilaterally alter the constitution, whereas most legislatures can change 
statutes as they wish, thus providing additional protection to their proposal.8  
Many states also allow legislatively referred – or indirect – initiatives where 
the state legislature is permitted to place a proposal on the ballot for voter 
approval.9   
Missouri voters encountered initiative and referendum in the voting 
booth on November 3, 2020, when deciding on Amendment 3.10  Amendment 
3 was the result of a legislature growing increasingly weary with Missouri’s 
direct initiative process and weaponizing citizens’ tools for democracy.11  The 
proposed constitutional amendment was an indirect initiative, referred to 
voters by the legislature.  However, this Note argues that the description of 
Amendment 3 as an “unpopular referendum” is more fitting.  Where a popular 
referendum describes a citizen-led effort to repeal the will of the legislature, 
“unpopular referendum” should describe a legislature’s  effort to repeal the 
will of the people.  Amendment 3 aimed to repeal a direct initiative, known as 
“Clean Missouri,” approved by voters less than two years earlier.12  The 2020 
measure survived considerable legal challenge.  The resulting case highlights 
the flaws in Missouri’s initiative and referendum processes and the weak 
judicial protections afforded to the procedures.  
In this Note, Part II introduces the case of Pippens v. Ashcroft which 
exemplifies the political tug-of-war occurring with the Missouri initiative 
process.  Part III explores how the Missouri legislature’s will often conflicts 
with voters’ wants and how elected officials’ mal-intent is becoming 
increasingly apparent.  Part IV examines several measures from other states 
 
5. See Nicholas R. Theodore, We the People: A Needed Reform of State Initiative 
and Referendum Procedures, 78 Mo. L. Rev. 1401 (2013).  
6. Id. at 1410. 
7. Id. at 1408. 
8. Id. 
9. Id. at 1409. 
10. 2020 Ballot Measures, MO. SECRETARY OF STATE (last visited March 6, 
2021), https://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/petitions/2020BallotMeasures 
[https://perma.cc/Q9VD-G4D4]. 
11. The Missouri General Assembly is ignoring the will of the voters by placing 
Amendment 3 on the 2020 general election ballot, COMMON CAUSE (last accessed 
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that, if adopted, would protect the initiative process in Missouri from such 
mal-intent and abuse.  Finally, Part V analyzes the government’s role in the 
judicial review and drafting of ballot language which could ease the conflict 
in Pippens and strengthen Missouri’s initiative process. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
To sufficiently understand the facts of Pippens, an examination of 
“Clean Missouri” is required.  On November 6, 2018, Missouri voters 
approved Constitutional Amendment No. 1.13  Supporters of this proposal 
nicknamed it “Clean Missouri.”14  This amendment was proposed by the 
direct initiative petition process, where Missouri citizens independently 
propose legislation for the ballot through the collection of signatures.15  
“Clean Missouri” made multiple revisions to Article III of the Missouri 
Constitution which established the legislative branch, or the General 
Assembly, of the Missouri state government.16  The amendment focused 
primarily on ethics reform and on the process of drawing legislative districts, 
known as apportionment.17  
 “Clean Missouri” provided for substantial modifications to the 
apportionment process for state House and Senate districts.18  It established a 
new state position known as the “nonpartisan state demographer” who was 
charged with preparing proposed legislative redistricting plans and maps 
following the decennial census.19  The nonpartisan state demographer was 
also given criteria to govern the designing of said districts.20  The 
demographer had to give the districts a “total population as nearly equal as 
practicable to the ideal population for such districts.”21  Specifically, “Clean 
Missouri” required that districts be designed in a manner that achieves both 
partisan fairness and competitiveness.22  The demographer also had to 
consider geographic contiguity, the boundaries of existing political 
subdivisions, and the compactness of the proposed districts.23  However, these 
 
13. Pippens v. Ashcroft, 606 S.W.3d 689, 694  (Mo. Ct. App. 2020). 
14. Jo Mannies, New limits to campaign finance confuse Missouri’s political 




15. Pippens, 606 S.W.3d at 694. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Ritter v. Ashcroft, 561 S.W.3d 74, 80 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018). 
19. Id. at 80–81; see MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 3(a)–(c), 7(a) (2020). 
20. Ritter, 561 S.W.3d at 80–81; see MO. CONST. art. III, § 3(c). 
21. Ritter, 561 S.W.3d at 81; see MO. CONST. art. III, § 3(c)(1)(a), (b). 
22. Ritter, 561 S.W.3d at 81; see MO. CONST. art. III, § 3(c). 
23. Ritter, 561 S.W.3d at 81; see MO. CONST. art. III, § 3(c). 
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considerations are subordinated to consideration of equal populations, 
compliance with federal law, and partisan fairness and competitiveness.24   
“Clean Missouri” largely retained the procedure, enacted before its 
passage, where the Governor selected House and Senate reapportionment 
commissions.25  As provided by the revisions, the commissions could then 
make modifications to the demographer’s proposed plan and map by a vote of 
at least seven-tenths of the commissioners.26  If no modifications were made, 
the plan and map would become final.27  These citizen-proposed changes were 
widely accepted by Missouri voters and passed with sixty-two percent of the 
vote in November 2018.28  
In 2020, the General Assembly set out to undo “Clean Missouri.”  In its 
regular session that year, the General Assembly passed Senate Joint 
Resolution No. 38 (“SJR 38”) which submitted to voters a legislatively 
referred constitutional amendment which modified the features of 2018’s 
“Clean Missouri” ballot initiative.29  Its provisions were complex and 
comprehensive, affecting Missouri’s ethics laws and its redistricting 
processes.  The General Assembly passed SJR 38 on May 13, 2020, largely 
along party lines.30  It appeared on the November 3, 2020, General Election 
Ballot as Amendment 3.31  
The General Assembly has the prerogative to draft the official summary 
statement for legislatively referred constitutional amendments, like 
Amendment 3.32  The summary statement is the language that appears on 
ballots.  The legislature’s summary statement proposed to ask voters: 
Shall the Missouri Constitution be amended to: 
■ Ban all lobbyist gifts to legislators and their employees; 
■ Reduce legislative campaign contribution limits; and 
 
24. Ritter, 561 S.W.3d at 81; see MO. CONST. art. III, § 3(c)(1)(c), (d), (e). 
25. Ritter, 561 S.W.3d at 81; see MO. CONST. art. III, § 3(c)(2). 
26. Ritter, 561 S.W.3d at 81; see MO. CONST. art. III, §§ 3(c)(3), 7(c). 
27. Ritter, 561 S.W.3d at 81; see Mo. Const. art. III, §§  3(c)(3), 7(c). 
28. Official Results, General Election, November 6, 2018, MISSOURI SECRETARY 
OF STATE, https://enrarchives.sos.mo.gov/enrnet/?eid=750004333 
[https://perma.cc/A8QD-NH5W]. 
29. Pippens v. Ashcroft, , 606 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D. 2020). 
30. S. JOURNAL, 100TH GEN. ASSEMB., 2d Sess. at 241–42 (Mo. 2020); H.R. 
JOURNAL, 100TH GEN. ASSEMB., 2d Sess. at 1772–73 (Mo. 2020). 
31. Pippens, 606 S.W.3d at 693. 
32. Id. at 698. 
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■ Create citizen-led independent bipartisan commissions to draw 
state legislative districts based on one person, one vote, minority voter 
protection, compactness, competitiveness, fairness, and other 
criteria?33 
The resolution was challenged in the courts by proponents of “Clean 
Missouri” almost immediately.34  On May 18, 2020, eight Missouri citizens 
(“Challengers”) filed suit against the Missouri Secretary of State and the 
leaders of the General Assembly as permitted by Missouri statute.35  The 
challengers argued that each of the three bullet points in the official ballot 
language drafted by the General Assembly for Amendment 3 were insufficient 
and unfair as they did not clearly communicate to voters that Amendment 3 
would largely repeal and replace “Clean Missouri.”36  The petition prayed for 
the circuit court to vacate the existing summary statement and either order the 
General Assembly to prepare a new one, or certify a replacement statement 
that they proposed.37  On August 17, 2020, the circuit court entered its final 
judgment, agreeing with the challengers that all three bullet points in the 
General Assembly’s proposed summary statement were insufficient and 
unfair.38  The circuit court vacated the General Assembly’s statement and 
certified an alternative summary statement which the court drafted itself:39 
Shall the Missouri Constitution be amended to: 
■ Repeal rules for drawing state legislative districts approved by 
voters in November 2018 and replace them with rules proposed by the 
legislature; 
■ Lower the campaign contribution limit for senate candidates by 
$100; and 
■ Lower legislative gift limit from $5 to $0, with exemptions for some 
lobbyists?40 
The defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on August 18, 2020, and oral 




35. Id.; Missouri law allows any citizen of Missouri to challenge the official 
ballot language for a legislatively referred constitutional initiative for being 
insufficient or unfair. MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.190 (West). 
36. Pippens, 606 S.W.3d at 698. 
37. Id. at 699. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 700. 
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for the Western District.41  The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the 
circuit court’s judgment.42 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Missouri has a long and storied history with direct initiative and popular 
referendum.  Both processes were added to the state’s constitution at the 
height of the Progressive Era in 1907 and have provided for some of 
Missouri’s most prominent policies.43  For example, in 1936, Missouri 
citizens voted to create a Conservation Commission – which now oversees the 
Missouri Department of Conservation – to manage fish, game, and forest 
resources.44  In 1940, a constitutional amendment was passed through an 
initiative petition that established a nonpartisan system for nominating, 
appointing, and retaining judges.45  This is now known as the “Missouri Plan” 
for judicial selection and has served as the model for several states.46  In recent 
decades, initiatives and referenda have resulted in meaningful policy 
initiatives that affect the daily lives of Missouri citizens.  Over one hundred 
ballot initiatives have been proposed by Missouri citizens.47  Increases to the 
minimum wage, union protections, healthcare expansion, and even medical 
marijuana have all been approved – or disapproved – by Missouri voters 
through a statewide popular vote.48  In contrast, popular referendum has been 
used only about twenty-five times since its creation and in only two of those 
instances was it successful.49 
In the last two decades, and in almost every general election since, 
Missouri citizens have passed many large-scale policy proposals via citizen-
led, direct initiative.  The policy proposals that have been approved via direct 
initiative include, but are not limited to:  
■ Stem cell research (2006) 
 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 713. 
43. Robin Carnahan, Protecting Missouri’s Initiative Petition Process for 
Citizens, MO MUNICIPAL REV. 10 (2012) (on file with author). 
44. Id. 
45. Id. 
46. See Charles B. Blackmar, Missouri's Nonpartisan Court Plan from 1942 to 
2005, 72 MO. L. REV. 199 (2007). 
47. David C. Valentine, Constitutional Amendments, Statutory Revision and 
Referenda Submitted to the Voters by the General Assembly or by Initiative Petition, 
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■ Increased the minimum wage (2006) 
■ Increased revenue for schools (2008) 
■ Created a “Renewable Energy Standard” for utility companies 
(2008) 
■ Prohibited taxing the transfer of real estate (2010) 
■ Regulated dog breeders (2010) 
■ Restructured STL police force (2012) 
■ Increased funding for education (2012) 
■ Reformed campaign finance (2016) 
■ Reformed redistricting (“Clean Missouri”) (2018) 
■ Sanctioned medical marijuana (2018)  
■ Increased the minimum wage (2018) 
■ Expanded Medicaid (2020)50 
The numerous successful initiatives and their varied topic areas demonstrate 
a citizenry dissatisfied with the legislative priorities of its elected officials.  
Instead of waiting for the General Assembly to pass meaningful legislation, 
citizens and advocates mobilized, fundraised, and organized to take advantage 
of Missouri’s tools of democracy.  “Clean Missouri’s” large margin of 
approval is just one of the many examples of citizens taking the state’s 
legislative power into their own hands, only to find they apparently went too 
far.  
Two years after their passage, the major provisions of “Clean Missouri” 
were narrowly repealed and replaced by Amendment 3.51  Mirroring the 
initiative process, the Missouri Constitution gives the General Assembly the 
right to legislatively propose constitutional amendments which shall be 
approved or rejected by a majority of the voters of the state.52  Unlike the 
citizen’s direct initiative process, the General Assembly is also authorized to 
draft the official ballot language and summary statement to be printed on 
 
50. Id.( (data from this report can be found at 
http://www.mofirst.org/issues/inr/MO-Petition-History.php [https://perma.cc/5XPX-
B72M]). 
51. 2020 Ballot Measures, MO. SECRETARY OF STATE (last visited March 6, 
2021), https://www.sos.mo.gov/elections/petitions/2020BallotMeasures 
[https://perma.cc/45SV-D87X]. 
52. MO. CONST. art. XII, § 2(b). 
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ballots which “shall be a true and impartial statement of the purposes of the 
proposed measure in language neither intentionally argumentative nor likely 
to create prejudice either for or against the proposed measure.”53 
 Any citizen can challenge the official ballot title proposed by the 
General Assembly for being insufficient or unfair.54  This judicial safeguard 
is designed to give voters the ability to judge the desirability of a proposed 
amendment.55  Furthermore, the challenge process is necessary to provide 
voters a full realization of the proposals by the General Assembly.56  Judicial 
review of ballot language, in particular, is especially important when 
challenging legislatively-referred proposals who draft their own statements.57  
In contrast, the language of citizen-proposed initiative petitions is drafted by 
the secretary of state and reviewed by the attorney general.58 
The burden to show the insufficiency or unfairness of the ballot language 
falls upon the challenging party.59  “Insufficiency” is defined as “inadequate; 
especially lacking adequate power, capacity, or competence.”60  “Unfairness” 
is defined as language that is “marked by injustice, partiality, or deception.”61  
Additionally, the summary statement should accurately reflect both the legal 
and probable effects of the proposal.62  It should also inform voters of the 
central features of the proposal.63  The applicable question is not whether the 
language drafted is the best summary, but whether the language gives the 
voter a sufficient idea of what the proposed amendment would accomplish 
and whether it advises the voter what it is about.64  
 
 
53. MO. ANN. STAT. § 116.155 (West). 
54. MO. ANN. STAT.  § 116.190 (West). 
55. Dotson v. Kander, 464 S.W.3d 190, 193 (Mo. 2015) (en banc). 
56. Id. at 193 (citing Buchanan v. Kirkpatrick, 615 S.W.2d 6, 11–12 (Mo. 1981) 
(en banc). 
57. Id. at 193–94. 
58. Id. at 203 n.4. 
59. Hill v. Ashcroft, 526 S.W.3d 299, 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 2017). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Shoemyer v. Sec'y of State, 464 S.W.3d 171, 174 (Mo. 2015) (citing Brown 
v. Carnahan, 370 S.W.3d 637, 654 (Mo. 2012)). 
63. Stickler v. Ashcroft, 539 S.W.3d 702, 709 (Mo. Ct. App.  2017) (internal 
citations omitted). 
64. Sedey v. Ashcroft, 594 S.W.3d 256, 263 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020), reh'g denied 
(Feb. 4, 2020). 
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IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District affirmed in part 
and reversed in part the circuit court’s decision that the entire original ballot 
language was insufficient and unfair.65  The Court of Appeals found that the 
first point of the original statement – “Ban all lobbyist gifts to legislators and 
their employees…” – was insufficient and unfair.66  The Court of Appeals 
found that the second point of the original statement – “Reduce legislative 
campaign contribution limits…” – was not insufficient and unfair and that the 
circuit court erred in its revision.67  The Court of Appeals found multiple 
problems in the third and final point of the original statement – “Create 
citizen-led independent bipartisan commissions to draw state legislative 
districts based on one person, one vote, minority voter protection, 
compactness, competitiveness, fairness, and other criteria…” – and rewrote it 
entirely.68  
The third point attracted the most criticism from the court.  As it was 
written, the original statement made no explicit reference to Amendment 3’s 
elimination of the position of Nonpartisan State Demographer, a primary 
feature of the redistricting process adopted by voters in 2018.69  Thus, the 
court held it as generally insufficient and unfair.70  Next, the third point 
claimed that the commissions proposed are “citizen-led” and “independent.”71  
The Court held such a description failed to accurately describe the 
membership and operation of the commissions, which are largely made up of 
partisan appointees.72  Finally, the Court held that the third point falsely 
implied that SJR 38 established the listed criteria for drawing districts and 
fails to acknowledge “in any fashion” that the proposal would greatly modify 
and reorder the existing criteria.73  The increased priority of “partisan fairness” 
and “competitiveness” was a primary feature of the redistricting process 
adopted by voters in 2018; this point failed to inform voters that it would move 
them to the very lowest priority.74 
The court also held that the fact that SJR 38 largely modifies “Clean 
Missouri,” which voters very recently approved, needed to be apparent.75  In 
compliance with each of these issues, the Court of Appeals certified an 
alternative summary statement, replacing the circuit court’s statement and 
 
65. Pippens v. Ashcroft, 606 S.W.3d 689, 693 (Mo. Ct. App.  2020). 
66. Id. at 698. 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 699. 
70. Id. 
71. Id. at 700. 
72. Id. at 709. 
73. Id. at 710 (emphasis in original). 
74. Id. at 711. 
75. Id. at 712. 
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amending the first and third points of the General Assembly’s original 
statement: 
Shall the Missouri Constitution be amended to: 
■ Ban gifts from paid lobbyists to legislators and their employees; 
■ Reduce legislative campaign contribution limits; and 
■ Change the redistricting process voters approved in 2018 by: (i) 
transferring responsibility for drawing state legislative districts from 
the Nonpartisan State Demographer to Governor-appointed 
bipartisan; (ii) modifying and reordering the redistricting criteria?76 
No appeal was made to the Supreme Court of Missouri by either party.  
As a result, the Court of Appeals’ alternate language was certified for the 
ballot in the general election.  On November 3, 2020, Missouri voters passed 
Amendment 3 with fifty-one percent voting “Yes” and forty-nine percent 
voting “No.”77   
V.  COMMENT 
On its face, Pippens v. Ashcroft is simply a case of what type of ballot 
language is “insufficient and unfair.”78  However, the analysis of the court, 
and the arguments of the parties, raise deeper questions worth examining.  
First, what happens when the will of the legislature conflicts with the policy 
goals of its constituents?  Second, how can various constitutional changes 
safeguard against the efforts of legislatures to overturn the goals of their 
constituents?  Finally, how can the state provide better – maybe nonpartisan 
– drafting assistance and judicial review to proponents of initiatives and 
referendums?  This Part addresses each of those questions in turn. 
A.  Legislative Antagonism 
An examination of recent legislative efforts reveal an antagonistic 
disposition towards the initiative and referendum process of Missouri.  Some 
would claim Missouri has one of the few idyllic “citizen-legislatures” in the 
 
76. Id. at 713.0 
77. Gregory J. Holman, By a narrow margin, Amendment 3 reversed ‘Clean 
Missouri.’ How did we get here?, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER, Nov. 5, 2020, 
https://www.news-leader.com/story/news/politics/2020/11/04/missouri-election-
results-amendment-3-fails-ends-clean-missouri/6159978002/. 
78. Pippens, 606 S.W.3d at 693 ; MO. REV. STAT. § 116.190. 
10
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nation, where career politicians “are replaced by average members of the 
community who enter and exit politics within a short period of time.”79  This 
characterization is facilitated by Missouri’s term limits for its state 
legislators.80  After serving eight years in each chamber, incumbents are 
forbidden to seek reelection.81  Proponents of such term limits often argue that 
they “enhance participatory democracy.”82  This Subpart argues that 
Missouri’s term limits have done just that, leading to a surge of successful 
initiative petitions being passed by actual citizens in the absence of legislative 
efforts to address issues facing Missourians since the state’s term limits have 
taken effect. 
The alleged “citizen-legislature” has now taken the drastic step to 
undermine the direct legislative efforts of the citizens.  This is not a rare 
occurrence.  One might say it is becoming a pattern.  Since term limits were 
instituted, the legislature has attacked such efforts at least three other times.83  
In 2008, the legislature created exceptions for renewable energy standards 
expected to be passed by voters months later by initiative.84  Next, in 2011, 
the same body repealed regulations for dog breeders passed by voters months 
earlier.85  Finally, after voters defeated “Right to Work” in 2018, there was a 
concerted effort to proceed with the policy anyway.86  A reflection upon these 
efforts aids in understanding the legislature’s intentions today and will shed 
light on recent comments and proposals by the governing party to axe the 
citizen-led initiative petition process.  
In 2008, the legislature sought to undermine the effectiveness of a direct 
initiative before its anticipated passage.  Proposition C was certified for the 
 
79. Richard G. Niemi & Kristin K. Rulison, The Effects of Term Limits on State 
Legislatures and Their Applicability to the Executive Branch, 4 ALB. GOV'T L. REV. 
641, 648–49 (2011). 
80. Id. at 660. 
81. MO. CONST. art. III, § 8. 
82. Elizabeth Garrett, Term Limitations and the Myth of the Citizen-Legislator, 
81 CORNELL L. REV. 623, 631 (1996). 
83. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 84–86. 
84. Earth Island Institute v. Union Electric Company, 456 S.W.3d 27, 31 (Mo. 
2015). 
85. S.B. 113 & 95, 96TH GEN. ASS., 1st Regular Sess. (Mo. 2011). 
86. Jack Suntrup, Missouri voters said no to ‘right to work,’ Republican 
lawmaker wants it anyway, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, (Dec. 6, 2018), 
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-politics/missouri-voters-said-no-to-
right-to-work-republican-lawmaker-wants-it-anyway/article_365c4f4a-3303-5cde-
a44e-b6324bf2ab59.html [https://perma.cc/H224-5QQC]. “Right to Work” laws 
guarantee that no person can be compelled, as a condition of employment, to join or 
not to join, nor to pay dues to a labor union. Right to Work Frequently-Asked 
Questions, NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEFENSE FOUNDATION, 
https://www.nrtw.org/right-to-work-frequently-asked-questions/ 
[https://perma.cc/L4GG-N2KP] (last visited March 7, 2021). 
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November ballot by the Secretary of State in February of 2008.87  The 
proposition was initiated by a citizen-led petition and it sought to enact a 
requirement that utility companies use an increasing amount of renewable 
energy in their electricity sales.88  In May of that same year, months before 
voters would vote on Proposition C in November, the General Assembly 
preemptively passed Senate Bill No. 1181.89  This bill created an exemption 
from renewable energy requirements, now or in the future, for power 
companies if they met alternative standards, conflicting with the ones 
proposed by Proposition C.90  The Supreme Court of Missouri later held that 
the efforts of the legislature “serve[d] as an end run around the constitutionally 
protected right of the people of Missouri to enact legislation by ballot 
initiative” and that the bill was repealed by Proposition C by implication when 
it passed with sixty-six percent of the vote.91  The resulting case, Earth Island 
Institute, is valuable in understanding the legislature’s antagonistic 
predisposition to the initiative petition process. 
In 2011, then-state Senator Mike Parson did not agree with Proposition 
B, a proposal through the initiative petition process that imposed tough 
regulations on dog breeders.92  He led a legislative effort to repeal the measure 
barely a month after fifty-two percent of voters approved it.93  “Telling our 
breeders how many dogs they can own and how to raise them is just the tip of 
the iceberg,” said then-Senator Parson when he introduced legislation 
eliminating many provisions included in Proposition B.94  The bill was passed 
in March 2011 and signed by the Governor, Democrat Jay Nixon, in April 
2011.95  Proposition B had just passed less than six-months earlier in 
 
87. It’s important to note that citizens can propose both propositions or 
constitutional amendments via the initiative petition process. Propositions, if passed, 
become statutes that can change at the will of the elected legislature. Amendments are 
set in the Constitution which can only be changed by statewide approval. Earth Island 
Inst., 456 S.W.3d at 30. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. at 31. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. at 34.. 
92. Virginia Young, Voters’ puppy mill law closer to repeal, ST. LOUIS POST-




94. Pamela M. Prah, Missouri’s puppy mill politics: Dog breeders outmaneuver 
animal-rights movement, THE SEATTLE TIMES, (May 25, 2011)), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/life/lifestyle/missouris-puppy-mill-politics-dog-
breeders-outmaneuver-animal-rights-movement/ [https://perma.cc/6R5A-BW2G]. 
95. S.B. 113 & 95, 96TH GEN. ASS., 1st Regular Sess. (Mo. 2011).  
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November of 2010.96  The move caught the criticism of advocates. “Some 
lawmakers are not only thumbing their noses at a statewide vote of the people, 
but are also voting against their own districts,” said Wayne Pacelle, then-
president and CEO of The Humane Society of the United States.97 
As of May 2019, Missouri had the largest number of puppy mills in the 
nation for the seventh year in a row, according to a report by the Humane 
Society of the United States.98  “That’s what our country was based on – us 
having a say so in our government . . . [i]f we vote for legislation and they are 
able to change it because they don’t like the way we voted, then I think that is 
wrong,” said Lauri Casey of Springfield, Missouri in response to repeal of 
most of Proposition C.99  
It seems to be increasingly common that the legislature does not approve 
of the policies its own citizens enact.  In December 2018, four months after 
citizens voted down an attempt – via referendum – by the General Assembly 
to make Missouri a “Right to Work” state, a Springfield-area state senator 
filed legislation to enshrine it in statute anyway.100  “Democracy is not 
freedom.  Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to eat for 
lunch,” Senator Burlison said to the KC Star.101  He further added that “in a 
Constitutional Republic there are certain rights which should never be taken 
away, not even by a 64% vote.”102 
More recently, legislators have exhibited explicit distaste at the passage 
of Medicaid Expansion by voters – via direct initiative – in August 2020.103  
In May, three months before the issue would be voted on, the budget chair of 
the Missouri House of Representatives, Representative Cody Smith, pushed a 
measure that would ensure all Medicaid expenditures be specifically approved 
 
96. Missouri Ballot Issue History, MISSOURI FIRST (last visited Mar. 8, 2021), 
http://www.mofirst.org/issues/inr/MO-Petition-History.php 
97. Kenn Bell, Missouri State Senate Overturns Puppy Mill Law Favored By 
Voters, THE DOG FILES, Mar. 10, 2011, 
https://www.thedogfiles.com/2011/03/10/missouri-state-senate-overturns-puppy-
mill-law-favored-by-voters/ [https://perma.cc/BV8L-PYPP]. 
98. The Horrible Hundred 2019, THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES 
(May 2019), https://www.humanesociety.org/sites/default/files/docs/2019_Horrible-
Hundred_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/KZG7-FM6C]. 
99. Bell, supra note 97. 
100.  Suntrup, supra note 86. 
101. Hunter Woodall, After Rejection By Missouri Voters, Republican 
Resurfaces Right-to-Work Legislation, THE KANSAS CITY STAR (De. 4, 2018 6:29 
PM), https://www.kansascity.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/the-
buzz/article222626700.html. 
102. Id. If still in effect, “Right to Work” legislation would have prevented 
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by the legislature.104  While it ultimately failed in the chamber, in a committee 
debate, Smith said that the measure could “theoretically allow legislators to 
choose not to fund Medicaid.”105  Still, even after its popular approval, some 
state senators signaled that the vote could essentially be ignored.106  Senator 
Bob Onder doubted the legislature would even fund the expansion in 2021, 
citing budget concerns and an appellate court’s decision supposedly granting 
the power to do so.107  Senator Eric Burlison also questioned the actual 
implementation of Medicaid Expansion.108  “There are going to be a lot of 
attorneys looking at this to see what flexibility we have … [a]nd from my 
understanding, you can’t take away the legislature’s authority to appropriate, 
so if the budget chairs in the House and Senate decide not to fund that line 
item, then at the end of the day it doesn’t happen.”109  This comment was made 
on Thursday, August 6th, 2020.110  Two days earlier, 1,263,776 Missouri 
voters exercised their constitutional right by passing Medicaid Expansion by 
a vote of 53.25% to 46.75%.111  The legislature did not implement Medicaid 
Expansion until it was ordered to do so by Missouri courts almost a year later 
in the Summer of 2021.112 
Moving further than criticism or distaste, a number of Missouri officials 
are now questioning the entire initiative petition process.  In interviews 
regarding the repeal of “Clean Missouri,” Governor Mike Parson has signaled 
 
104. Austin Huguelet, Missouri voters could expand Medicaid, then let 
lawmakers block it on the same ballot, SPRINGFIELD NEWS LEADER (May 11, 2020 
6:54 PM), https://www.news-leader.com/story/news/2020/05/11/could-gop-
resolution-block-medicaid-expansion-missouri/3108394001/ 
[https://perma.cc/JXH2-9WLH]; House Joint Resolution No. 106, 2nd Regular 
Session, 100th General Assembly, 
https://house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills201/hlrbillspdf/5152H.02C.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YHB4-USUL]. 
105. Huguelet, supra note 104. 
106. Jack Suntrup, Missouri voters approved Medicaid expansion, but roll-out 





108. Huguelet, supra note 104. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Alex Smith, Missouri Voters Approve Medicaid Expansion Despite 




112 Doyle v. Tidball, SC99185 (Mo. Jul. 22, 2021). 
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that he believes “it may also be time to raise the bar for initiative petitions to 
appear on the ballot.”113  A few months later, four state senators proposed a 
number of different measures that would raise the standards for efforts to 
legislate through the initiative petition process.114  At a hearing for the 
proposals, one witness stated that the standard would be so high that they 
would effectively eliminate the initiative petition process altogether.115  All 
measures failed in 2019.116  One was refiled in 2020 and it failed as well.117 
All of these statements and actions show a general antagonistic 
disposition by the legislature toward the initiative process that threatens 
Missourian’s right to initiative and referendum, the primary way in which 
citizens can respond to legislative neglect.   
B.  Constitutional Safeguards 
There are possible solutions to protect the initiative process from a 
legislative supermajority.  Some states ban similar initiatives and referenda 
from the ballot for a specific period of time.118  These policies aim to reduce 
the number of measures on the ballot and ensure advocates and opponents do 
not abuse the initiative process.  In Massachusetts, for example, a proposed 
initiative cannot be substantially similar as one that has appeared on the ballot 
in either of the two preceding elections, which is essentially a six-year ban.119  
Such a restriction would be welcome in Missouri to protect the citizen-led 
initiative process. 
In addition, various states place limits on the legislature’s power to 
amend and repeal citizen-initiated statutes.120  This restriction exists with the 
 
113. David A. Lieb, Missouri governor wants repeal of new redistricting law, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 23, 2018),  
https://apnews.com/7702bd1c62244505a0653a99167480e3 [https://perma.cc/YQA3-
KPAT]. 
114. S.B. 5 & 256, SJRs 1, 7, & 11, 100th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., 2019.  
115. Alisha Shurr, Senators propose upping initiative petition requirements, 
THE MISSOURI TIMES, (Feb. 13, 2019), https://themissouritimes.com/senators-
propose-upping-initiative-petition-requirements/ [https://perma.cc/8AWZ-RND2].  
116. SBs 5 & 256, SJRs 1, 7, & 11, 100th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., 2019. 
117. SJR 31, 100th Gen. Ass., 2nd Reg. Sess., 2020.  
118. At least five states have prohibited the same or a substantially similar 
measure from reappearing on the ballot for a specified period of time after it is rejected 
by voters: Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Wyoming. See Initiative 
and Referendum in the 21st Century, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, (July 
2002), https://www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-campaigns/task-force-report.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/72YE-BHSL]. 
119. MASS. CONST., art. LXXIV, Sec. 1. 
120. A legislature's power to amend and/or repeal a statute passed by the 
initiative has beenrestricted in at least 10 states: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, 
California, Michigan, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, Washington, and Wyoming. 
See Initiative and Referendum in the 21st Century, supra note 117. 
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hope that it would incentivize statutory initiatives over constitutional ones, 
which tend to be more pliable.  Often, and especially in Missouri, petitioners 
choose to amend the constitution so the legislature cannot change it on a 
whim.121  For example, in Arizona, the legislature cannot repeal a statutory 
initiative.122  To amend it, the body must pass a proposed change with a three-
fourths vote and the amendment must “further the purpose” of the measure.123 
There are other restrictions worth examining that would limit the 
legislature’s power to submit to constitutional amendments to voters.  In 
Missouri, a simple majority is required in the legislature to submit to voters a 
constitutional amendment.124  Twenty-six states require legislatively referred 
constitutional amendments to be approved by a supermajority before they go 
to the ballot.125  Nine require a sixty percent supermajority vote in one session 
of the state’s legislature.126  Seventeen others required a two-thirds – 66.67 
percent – supermajority vote in one session of the state’s legislature.127  For 
example, in South Carolina, a legislatively referred constitutional amendment 
can be submitted to voters if it is approved by two-thirds vote of each chamber 
of the state legislature.128  South Carolina further limits the legislature’s power 
by requiring a second affirmative vote if voters approve the amendment.129   
Finally, eleven states require the legislature to pass constitutional 
amendment proposals twice in consecutive sessions in order to refer them to 
 
121. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, INITIATIVE AND 
REFERENDUM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 10 (2002), 
https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/legismgt/irtaskfc/IandR_report.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5NKN-E29S]; see also Initiative and Referendum in the 21st 
Century, supra note 117.. 
122. ARIZ. CONST., art. IV, pt. 1, § 1, paras. 6, 15. 
123. Id. 
124. MO. CONST., art. XII, § 2(b).  
125. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 120; 
Initiative and Referendum in the 21st Century, supra note 117. 
126. ALA. CONST. art XVIII, § 284; FLA. CONST. art. XI, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. 
XIV, § 3; Kent. Const. § 256; MD. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; NEB. CONST. art. XIV, § 1; 
N.H. CONST. art. 100, pt. II; N.C. CONST. art. XIII, § 4; OHIO CONST. art. XVI § 1.   
127. ALASKA CONST., art. XIII, § 1; CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1; COLO. CONST. 
art. XIX § 2; GA. CONST. art. X, § 1, para. II; IDAHO CONST. art. XX, § 1; KAN. CONST. 
art. 14, § 1; LA. CONST. art. XIII, § 1; ME. CONST. art. X, § 4; MICH. CONST. art. XII, 
§ 1; MISS. CONST. art. XV, § 273; MONT. CONST. art. XIV, § 8; S.C. CONST. art. XVI, 
§ 1; TEX. CONST. art. 17, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. XXIII, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. XXIII, 
§ 1; W. VA. CONST. art. XIV, § 2; WYO. CONST. art. 20, § 1. 
128. S.C. CONST. art. XVI, § 1. 
129. SId. 
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the ballot.130  Some require two votes in some circumstances and one vote in 
others, depending on, among other factors, how decisive the first vote was.131  
For example, the Tennessee General Assembly must approve a proposed 
amendment in two successive sessions before it is submitted to voters.132  The 
first approval only needs a majority approval.133  The second session, the 
proposal must earn a two-thirds supermajority before being placed on the 
ballot.134  Four states use a system that is a hybrid model between 
supermajority approval and the consecutive session requirement.135  For 
example, in Connecticut, the state legislature must approve a proposed 
amendment by a supermajority vote of seventy-five percent.136  But, if the 
legislature approves the measure by a simple majority in consecutive sessions, 
such approval is sufficient for submission to voters.137  
Any of the restrictions discussed above would have prevented the 
underlying conflict in Pippens.138  By either protecting citizen-led initiatives 
or restricting legislatively referred ones, the will of voters could be guarded 
from antagonization by elected officials.  However, absent these constitutional 
reforms, states like Missouri depend on judicial protections to avoid abuse of 
the initiative and referendum processes.  As Pippens demonstrated, Missouri’s 
existing judicial protections are not enough.  
C.  Judicial Safeguards 
Modern judicial review of state constitutional amendments is largely 
deferential, imposing limits only on the procedure of their implementation and 
not their substance.139  Relevant procedural review includes the courts’ ability 
to review ballot language of a proposed amendment via initiative or 
referendum.140  In Missouri, such review is allowed by statute and is designed 
 
130. IND. CONST. art. 16 § 1; IOWA CONST. art. X, § 1; MASS. CONST. art. 
XLVIII, pt. IV; NEV. CONST. art. 16, §1; N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 1; PA. CONST. art. 
XI, § 1; S.C. CONST. art. XVI, § 1; TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3; VT. CONST. § 72; VA. 
CONST. art. XII, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. XII, § 1.  
131. See NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 120; 
Initiative and Referendum in the 21st Century, supra note 117. 
132. TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
135. CONN. CONST. art. XII, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. XVII, § 3; N.J. CONST. art 
IX; PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1. 
136. CONN. CONST. art XII, § 1. 
137. Id. 
138. Pippens v. Ashcroft, 606 S.W.3d 689, 698–700 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020). 
139. Jonathan L. Marshfield, Forgotten Limits on the Power to Amend State 
Constitutions, 114 NW. U. L. REV. 68 (2019).  
140. See id. at 68–70 n. 10; see also NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES, supra note 120; Initiative and Referendum in the 21st Century, supra 
note 117. 
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to protect against insufficient and unfair language.141  In an ideal world, the 
resulting language is fair and sufficient after a challenge in court.  However, 
in practice, and as demonstrated by Pippens, judicial review of ballot language 
does little to ensure voters receive a fair and sufficient description of a 
measure if the measure is fundamentally designed to deceive.142  
Section 116.190 of the Missouri Revised Statutes provides Missouri 
courts – specifically the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri – the power 
to edit insufficient and unfair ballot language.143  This power to correct 
deficient language is reflected in a great majority of states.144  Such flexibility 
is desired for citizen-initiated measures.  Citizens and advocates often have 
little to no legal background or legislative expertise and a minor deficiency 
should not be fatal to their efforts.  However, should the court allow such 
flexibility and grace to a powerful body like a state legislature ruled by a 
supermajority? 
In Florida, the judicial review of ballot language is unique.145  Florida 
courts do not serve as editors of proposed ballot language but rather 
executioners.146  If language is found to be legally insufficient, the courts do 
not correct them as they see fit; defective language results in the entire 
measure being stricken from the ballot.147  Such an error is fatal.  Critics 
rightfully deride such judicial power to remove a decision for Florida 
voters.148  Advocates and organizers have often invested immense amounts of 
time and money into a citizen-led initiative or referendum only to have the 
entire effort set aside by a panel of judges.149  However, a legislatively referred 
constitutional amendment goes to the ballot by a simple majority vote of a 
governing body.150 
Missouri should take note of Florida’s extraordinary power of judicial 
review.  If a legislatively referred constitutional amendment is found to have 
 
141. MO. REV. STAT. § 116.190 (2017). 
142. See Pippens, 606 S.W.3d at 698–700. 
143. MO. REV. STAT. § 116.190 
144. Thomas Rutherford, The People Drunk or the People Sober? Direct 
Democracy Meets the Supreme Court of Florida, 15 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 61, 171 
(2002).  
145. Id. at 170. 
146. Id. at 171 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Jack Suntrup, Missouri abortion rights supporters sue secretary of state 




150. MO. CONST., art. XII § 2(a).  
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insufficient and unfair ballot language, such a defect should be fatal and not 
simply grounds for correction.  The entire measure should be forbidden from 
appearing on the ballot until the legislature itself can create language that 
meets legal standards in its next session.  Otherwise, in their review, courts 
essentially provide step-by-step instructions for the drafters to rewrite their 
proposal to abide by state law while still accomplishing their self-serving 
objectives. 
This leads to the question, why should the drafting of language remain 
within the domain of the legislature or a partisan official?  The substantive 
dispute in Pippens is primarily about who should be in charge of redistricting 
and apportionment of legislative districts.151  The 2018 measure put the 
process in nonpartisan hands.152  Ballot summaries and language of initiative 
and referendums, whether proposed by citizens or the legislature, should be 
placed in similarly non-partisan hands.  Ballot language, often a few hundred 
words, can determine if a measure succeeds or fails.153  Legislatures and 
partisan Secretary of States often face a conflict of interests when drafting a 
statement required to be “sufficient and fair” for the proposal they hope to 
pass.154  Which raises an important question of why let citizens or elected 
officials draft a ballot summary or initiative at all? 
Many states with initiative and petition offer assistance to proponents on 
the drafting of the relevant summary statement and ballot language.  This 
could be accomplished with two types of assistance: technical review and 
substantive review.155  Technical review is exercised to ensure the proposal 
meets legal requirements for formal and style and adheres to drafting 
conventions.156  However, in states like Colorado, that review goes a step 
further to ensure the quality, consistency, and fairness of initiative proposals 
and their summary statements.157 
In Colorado, the Legislative Council staff and Legislative Legal Services 
hold public hearings on proposed initiatives to present their review and 
comments.158  These hearings help proponents clarify their proposal, but they 
are not required to accept any suggestions offered by legislative staff.159  The 
meeting, held in the Capitol, is open to the public and although people who 
 
151. Pippens v. Ashcroft, 606 S.W.3d 689, 695–96 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020). 
152. Id. at 696. 
153. See Grayson Keith Sieg, A Citizen's Guide to Redistricting Reform Through 
Referendum, 63 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 901, 938 (2015); William A. Lund, What's in A 
Name? The Battle over Ballot Titles in Oregon, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 143, 153–54 
(1998). 
154. Lack of legislative expertise can apply to members of the state legislature 
and citizens and advocates can also have conflicting interests. 
155. Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative: 
Procedures That Do and Don't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 79 (1995). 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 81–82. 
158. Id. at 81. 
159. Id. at 81–82. 
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may oppose a measure are welcome to attend, no testimony or comments are 
accepted from anyone other than the proponents.160  The meeting is taped and 
becomes public record.161  Proponents are required to go through this process 
before they can move on to the next step of setting a title.162 
Colorado also has a special Ballot Title Board that drafts the language 
and summary statements that eventually go to voters.163  The Board is not 
quite nonpartisan; it consists of the elected Secretary of State, the Attorney 
General, and the director of the office of legislative services.164  Within two 
weeks of a submitted initiative, the board must draft a title for the initiative, a 
submission clause, and a clear, concise summary, all approved by a majority 
vote of the board.165  The Colorado Constitution further requires the state to 
mail a “ballot information booklet” to every registered voter before the 
election and also requires the state to publish the proposed provisions in 
newspaper notices.166  These requirements would help to ensure the electorate 
rightfully understands the measures it has been asked to adopt.  
Whether Missouri works to make defects in ballot language fatal, like 
Florida, or hopes to institute an independent body to draft initiatives, like 
Colorado, the General Assembly should explore ways to improve the flaws in 
the state’s review of ballot language.  The current process is not working.  
Proponents of a measure are allowed to draft its appearance to voters.167  
Courts only have the power to modestly edit language that is fundamentally 
designed to deceive.  Such a combination results in a power imbalance that 
threatens popular majority rule.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Pippens v. Ashcroft is the result of an escalating conflict between a 
legislature’s will and the citizen’s want.168  Without needed protections and 
reform, the initiative and referenda processes of Missouri are at risk of abuse 
by a legislature who has failed to show restraint.  Citizens continue to use their 
 
160. Id. at 79, 93–94. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 79. 
163. Id. at 93–94. 
164. Id. at 94. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 99. 
167. See MO. CONST. art. III, see also Gladys Bautista, Understanding the 
ballot: What to know about Missouri Amendment 3, KRCG (Oct. 14, 2020), 
https://krcgtv.com/news/local/understanding-your-ballot-what-to-know-about-
missouri-amendment-3 [https://perma.cc/EF2A-CFWB]. 
168. 606 S.W.3d 689 (Mo. Ct. App. 2020). 
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rightful power to direct initiative and popular referendum.  As demonstrated 
in 2020, the supermajority in Jefferson City is happy to exercise indirect 
initiative and unpopular referendum in response.169  The legislature, with a 
slap on the wrist from the Court of Appeals, successfully repealed – with a 
bare majority – a measure enacted by nearly two-thirds of Missouri voters.  It 
is the latest example in a growing trend of contempt held by elected officials 
against the initiative process and their own constituency.  Missourians were 
hoodwinked and confused by language written for that purpose.  This time, 
popular reforms were replaced by a less-popular return to status-quo.  The 
result is an unfortunate result for any proponents of direct democracy.  Still 
larger threats of regression loom and the flaws in Missouri’s democratic 
system must be addressed.   
 
169. See Gabriella Limón & Yurij Rudensky, Missouri Amendment 3 Passed, 
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